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THE PROBLEM OF APPLICATION OF THE FAULT
PRINCIPLE TO AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS*
S. PRAKASH SINHAf
THIS ARTICLE is an attempt to study the role of the fault principle
in the development of legal thought on civil liability. It examines
the operation of the fault system in meeting the current problem of
automobile-accident injury and summarizes the alternative solutions
suggested to resolve the present difficulties.
I. FAULT PRINCIPLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
THOUGHT ON CIVIL LIABILITY
The origins of tort liability in Anglo-American jurisprudence
are found in the primitive Germanic law. This law corresponded to
the characteristics of its culture, and consequently was dominated by
superstition and irrationality. Therefore it is no surprise that the
ideas of transgression of ceremonial observances, propitiation of dieties
by gifts and sacrifices, litigation decision by diety or chance as, for
example, through engaging in formal combat or pollution by contact
of such objects as blood or corpse, became essential elements of the
emerging dogma.' When a visible source of the evil result appeared,
superstition guided an instinctive impulse to visit it with vengeance
and liability for the result was accordingly determined. Thus, the doer
of a deed was liable because he was the doer even though he did it
inadvertently; the owner of a harm-producing instrument was liable
because he was its owner even though it had been stolen; the em-
ployer was liable for his workman's death because his business had
been the occasion of the evil even though the death was accidental;
the oath-helper was liable because he swore in support of a guilty
party's oath even though he did so in good faith; the judge was liable
for a wrong judgment even though given in good faith; the owner
of an animal was liable because he was the owner; and the master of
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1. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1-3), 7 HARV.
L. Rtv. 315, 383, 441, 315-18 (1894). See generally H. L4A, SUPtRSTITION AND FORCE
(1870).
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APPLICATION OF THE FAULT PRINCIPLE
a slave was liable because he was the master. Nothing was an acci-
dent. Something or someone was responsible for an evil result, how-
ever limited the causal connection might have been. Similarly, no lia-
bility attached for an attempt to do an evil since there was no visible
evil result, nor was there liability for merely instigating an evil deed
since the prime actor was the visible source.2
The principal sources of harm, in this period, were personal
deed, animal, inanimate thing, and servant or slave. With respect to
harm from personal deed, the primitive form of absolute liability be-
came comparatively obsolete as time passed.' As superstition declined,
a notion of misadventure grew. Consequently, although strict law re-
quired punishment, an appeal made to the king or the lord for pardon
on the basis of certain facts, could result in release from the death
penalty or blood feud.4 In the earlier days of this defense a fine never-
theless had to be paid.' Later, the misadventurer was required to give
notice of the incident immediately after its occurrence under an ex-
culpatory oath affirming its accidental or self-defensive nature.' A
similar line of development occurred wtih respect to liability for harm
from animals. While in the doctrine's early stages of evolution, there
were a few instances of absolute liability against the owner, 7 subse-
quently, the unintentional nature of the deed removed the privilege of
the injured party to carry out a blood feud, although the owner of
the animal was still monetarily liable.8 In later years the owner came
to be absolved completely if he made an exculpatory oath9 and either
surrendered the animal to the injured party for infliction of vengeance
(or as compensation)" 0 or turned it loose." The development with re-
spect to liability for harm from inanimate things was similar to that
of personal deed and animals. From its primitive form of strict lia-
bility, 12 the doctrine evolved to a pecuniary liability,'" which was
2. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 317 & nn.2, 6-8, 318 & nn.l-4.
3. Id. at 321 nn.1-3 (instances drawn from early German, Sicilian, and Anglo-
Saxon law), 321 n.3 (illustrations drawn from Greek, Roman, and Hebrew writings).
4. Id. at 322 & nn.3-6, 323 & nn.1-6, 324 & n.1 (illustrations drawn from early
English, French, and Dutch law).
5. Id. at 324 & nn.2-4 (illustrations drawn from English, Dutch, and French law).
6. Id. at 324-25 & nn.1-2 (illustrations drawn from Dutch, French, and
Swedish law).
7. Id. at 325 & n.4.
8. The formula for computation of this sum varied. See id. at 325-26 & nn.1-9.
9. Id. at 327 & nn.1-2, 328 & n.1 (illustrations from Flemish, French, and
Salic writings).
10. Id. at 326 & nn.10-12.
11. Id. at 326 & nn.13-15. The owner avoids liability if the animal escaped from
him, thereby breaking the connection between the two. See, e.g., Mitchil v. Alestree,
86 Eng. Rep. 190 (K.B. 1677). See also O.W. HOLMES, Tug COMMON LAW 21-22
(M. Howe ed. 1963).
12. Id. at 328 & n.2.
13. Id. at 328.
SPRING 1969]
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1969], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
sometimes accompanied by the surrender of the thing.14 Later pro-
vision was made for complete freedom from liability through sur-
render, repudiation, or nonuse of the thing."5 Such liability was some-
times accompanied by an exculpatory oath,16 which was often condi-
tioned upon a test similar to that of due care." With respect to
harm done by a slave or servant, the master was initially held abso-
lutely liable.' Later, he could avoid liability by surrendering the
servant to the court, although at first he still paid compensation and
thereby avoided the blood feud.'" In time, however, the value of the
surrendered slave was allowed to be set off and, eventually, complete
exoneration could be obtained by surrender 20 accompanied by an ex-
culpatory oath.2 Generally speaking, the. master's control over the
harm done, or his consent to it, had some effect on his liability, and
absence of such control or consent sometimes relieved him of re-
sponsibility.22
The principles of tort liability evolved during the period from
the 14th to the middle of the 19th century with fault gradually be-
coming the central element of liability.23 While only a crude distinction
was made between willful acts and acts of misadventure at the time
of the Norman Conquest, by the middle of the 19th century distinc-
tions were made among acts done willfully, done at peril, and done
negligently.24 With respect to personal deed, liability was determined
without regard to personal blameworthiness until the end of the 15th
century. However, since the early 16th century, the defendant was
able to appeal to some standard of blame or fault. Thus, given his
voluntary act, he could still excuse himself on the basis of inevitable
necessity or non potuit aliter facere (that the act had been without
14. See P. THORSEN, JurrIsH TowN LAWS 19, 49, 75, 192 (1842), cited in
Wigmore, supra note 1, at 328 & n.4.
15. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 328 & nn.5-7, 329 & nn.1-2.
16. Id. at 329 & n.4.
17. Id. at 329 & nn.5-9, 330 & n.1.
18. Id. at 330 & n.3.
19. Id. at 330-31 & nn.1-2.
20. Id. at 331 & nn.3-6.
21. Id. at 331 & n.7, 332 & n.1.
22. Id. at 332-35.
23. See generally C. FivOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCUS O TMl Coammox LAW 154-83(1949); F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENC9 IN THE CIVIL LAW 36-43 (1950); Fleming, The
Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. Rzv. 815, 815-23 (1967);
Goodhart & Winfield, Trespass and Negligence, 49 LAW Q. Rtv. 359 (1933) ; Prichard,
Trespass, Case and the Rule in Williams v. Holland, 1964 CAMB. L.J. 234.
24. Wigmore calls this achievement "the process of rationalization nearly accom-
plished . . ." Wigmore, supra note 1, at 456. But Ehrenzweig views this as an
exhibition of an irrational desire for relief from guilt feelings, tolerated by a maso-
chistic tendency of self-punishment. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence,
47 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 855, 869 (1953).
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blame).2 It was not until the 19th century that in England 26 and the
United States27 it seemed well settled that due care on the part of the
defendant might be a good defense. Self-defense earned pardon in
the 13th and 14th centuries, 8 and operated as a complete defense since
the year 1400.2' The primitive notions of popular superstitions gov-
erned the liability of a lunatic until early in the 17th century when
his liability became equivalent to that of an ordinary person." Simi-
larly, the infant was not liable in trespass until 1457,"' but by the 17th
century came to be held responsible on the ground that infancy was
immaterial for civil liability. 2
An examination of legal history from the 14th through the 17th
centuries suggests that for the first 100 years the master was held
absolutely liable for harm done by his servants or other agents. The
command or consent test, noted above, was first used in cases of
morally reprehensible acts, and, by the early 16th century, became a
general rule in trespass. 3 In the 16th and 17th centuries the test
evolved into the doctrine of particular command, which was related
to the wrongful act itself. Later, in the 17th and the 18th centuries,
the demands of new industry and commerce produced a distinction
between servants and agents and, correspondingly, there appeared
a gradual modification of the particular command test to the rule
of implied command from a general authority." Toward the end
25. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773) ; Dickenson v.
Watson, 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1682); Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.
1616) ; Cotterill v. Starkey, 173 Eng. Rep. 676 (N.P. 1839) ; Boss v. Litton, 172 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (N.P. 1832). For American cases see, e.g., Center v. Finney, 17 Barb. 94
(N.Y. 1852); Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & D. Supp. 193 (N.Y. 1843); Dygert v.
Bradley, 8 Wend. 469 (N.Y. 1832), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 443 & n.4, 444
& nn.1&2, 445 & n.2.
26. See, e.g., Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86; Holmes v. Mather, [1875]
L.R. 10 Ex. 261.
27. See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Harvey v.
Dunlop, Hill & D. Supp. 193 (N.Y. 1843) ; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 61, 29 Am.
Dec. 145 (1835), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 445 n.2.
28. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 445, 446 & n.1.
29. Id. at 446 & n.4.
30. See, e.g., Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), cited in Wigmore,
supra note 1, at 447 & n.1.
31. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 447-48 & n.7.
32. Id. at 448 & n.8.
33. See, e.g., Michael v. Alestree, 83 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1677) ; Cremer v.
Humberston, 84 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1669) ; Southerne v. Howe, 81 Eng. Rep. 621,
635 (K.B. 1619); Waltham v. Mulgar, 72 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1606); Seaman v.
Brownings, 74 Eng. Rep. 771 (C.P. 1589), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 384-91
in addition to other examples.
34. See, e.g., Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53, 125 (K.B. 17-35) ; Grammar
v. Nixon, 93 Eng. Rep. 761 (K.B. 1726); Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664(K.B. 1722); Mead v. Hamond, 93 Eng. Rep. 663 (K.B. 1722); Hern v. Nichols,
91 Eng. Rep. 256 (K.B. 1709) ; Middleton v. Fowler, 91 Eng. Rep. 247 (K.B. 1699) ;
Jones v. Hart, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1699) ; Tuberville v. Stamp, 92 Eng. Rep. 671(K.B. 1698) ; Boson v. Sandford, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1689), cited in Wigmore, supra
note 1, at 394-97.
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of the 18th and into the 19th century, the command test was re-
placed by the modern test of scope of employment.3 5 In the area of
harm from animals, at the beginning of the 14th century liability for
harm from biting or otherwise wounding was based on the owner's
knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities, i.e. scienter, or on
his incitement of the animal to trespass. 6 This basis prevailed until
the beginning of the 18th century, 7 when it was modified to the effect
that scienter was not required as to harm done by naturally mischiev-
ous animals.5 8 For land trespass of animals, strict liability generally
continued to be imposed," although there was no liability for minor
trespasses, as for example, snatching a mouthful of grass4" or for
wandering when driven along the highway lawfully, provided the
driver was free from fault and made a fresh pursuit.41 Though the
latter immunity first prevailed on the basis of the custom to fence,42
when the custom finally disappeared,45 the defense continued indepen-
dently of its basis.44 Strict liability was imposed for failure to pre-
vent harm from fire until the early 18th century,45 when liability was
first abolished for certain accidental fires.46 Thus, generally speak-
ing, in the 19th century liability came to be determined by the generic
test of fault, while strict liability prevailed only for certain activities
performed at the actor's peril.47
35. See, e.g., Laugher v. Pointer, 108 Eng. Rep. 204 (K.B. 1826) ; Nicholson v.
Mouncey, 104 Eng. Rep. 890 (K.B. 1812) ; Ellis v. Turner, 101 Eng. Rep. 1529
(K.B. 1800); M'Manus v. Crickett, 102 Eng. Rep. 43 (K.B. 1800); Stone v. Cart-
wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 622 (K.B. 1795); Savignac v. Roome, 101 Eng. Rep. 470
(K.B. 1794) ; Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 987 (C.P. 1799) ; Morley v. Gaisford,
126 Eng. Rep. 639 (C.P. 1795), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 399-401.
36. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 449 & n.10, 450 & n.1, 451 & n.1.
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Pelah, 93 Eng. Rep. 1171 (K.B. 1747) ; Buxendin v. Sharp,
91 Eng. Rep. 564 (K.B. 1697) ; Mitten v. Fandrye, 79 Eng. Rep. 1259 (K.B. 1605) ;
Bayntine v. Sharp, 125 Eng. Rep. 47 (C.P. 1704), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1,
at 450 & n.2.
38. See, e.g., Filburn v. People's Palace Co., [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 258; Mason v.
Keeling, 88 Eng. Rep. 1359 (K.B. 1700), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 450
& nn.4&5.
39. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 450, 451 & nn.1&2.
40. Id. at 451 & n.4.
41. Id. at 451 & n.5.
42. See, e.g., Dovaston v. Payne, 126 Eng. Rep. 684 (C.P. 1795), cited in
Wigmore, supra note 1, at 451 & n.6 in addition to other examples.
43. See, e.g., Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 175 Eng. Rep. 742 (N.P. 1858), cited in
Wigmore, supra note 1, at 451 & n.7.
44. Along the lines expressed earlier in Mitten v. Fandrye, 79 Eng. Rep. 1259
(K.B. 1605), cited in Wigmore, supra note 1, at 452 & n.1.
45. Wigmore, supra note 1, at 448 & nn.5-7.
46. 10 Anne, c.14, at 305 (1712) ; Filliter v. Phippard, 116 Eng. Rep. 506 (Q.B.
1847). See Wigmore, supra note 1, at 449.
47. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 282.
[VOL. 14: p. 386
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The original source of the fault principle is probably the princi-
ple of culpa in the Roman Lex Acquilia4 Before the Anglo-American
law embraced it in the 19th century, it had been accepted as a basis of
liability in the uncodified civil law of France,49 which was restated
by Pothier5 ° in the 18th century and embodied in the Code of Napoleon
in 1804.51 In England, Austin adopted it in his writings in 1832,52
in pursuance of the reforms suggested by Bentham. 3 The principle
is also linked with the Hegelian philosophy of the concept of man
as a morally responsible being. 4 In the common law, the fault principle
was applied in trespass on the case and extended to actions in trespass
vi et armis. Its growth was facilitated by the abolition of the old
forms of action55 in response to the needs of a developing industrial
economy, whose growth could not be obstructed by allowing extensive
liability to financially hinder entrepreneurs.5 Thus, the social and
economic demands of the industrial revolution generated not only the
growth of industry and commerce, but also crystallized the principle
of fault for legal liability. 7
As the 20th century progresses, it is becoming increasingly evi-
dent that the social misfortunes of loss, left uncompensated because
of the fault principle, exceed the amount of the loss itself.5 There-
48. F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 36-43 (1950).
49. Donnelly, The Fault Principle: A Sketch of Its Development in Tort Law
During the Nineteenth Century, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 728, 736 (1967).
50. Pothier stated:
Torts are the third cause of obligation and quasi-torts the fourth.
A tort is an act, by which, through fraud or malice, a person occasions damage
or injury to another.
A quasi-tort is an act by which without malice, but through inexcusable im-
prudence, a person occasions damage or injury to another ....
R.J. POTHIER, OBLIGATIONS 73 (1802), cited in Donnelly, supra note 49, at 736.
51. According to the Code:
Art. 1382. Any act by which a person causes damage to another makes the per-
son by whose fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation for such damage.
Art. 1383. Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his acts,
but also by his negligence or imprudence.
TIE FRENCH CIVIL CODE OP 1804, quoted in A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 339 (1957).
52. See, 1 J. AuSTIN, JURISPRUDENcE 468-70 (5th ed. 1885).
53. 2 COLLECTION OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 65 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
54. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox transl. 1965).
55. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 89 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
56. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295-96 (1850). See 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW op TORTS 752 (1956); Cohen, Fault and the Automobile
Accident: The Lost Issue in California, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 164, 165 (1964).
57. See generally I T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS Op LEGAL LIABILITY 71-85(1906) ; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1908) ; Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher (pts. 1-3), 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 373, 423 (1911); Fleming,
The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815, 815-19 (1967)
Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 HARV. L. REv. 954 (1918).
58. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d
436, 440-41 (1944) (concurring opinion) ; President & Dir. of Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Pound, The End of Law as Developed
in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 233 (1914).
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fore, a trend away from the fault system has begun (a) with respect
to certain harms for which liability is imposed without reference to
fault and (b) in the workings of the fault system itself.
(a) For certain harms, the issue of liability is decided with-
out reference to the fault principle. The most notable example is
injury from an object or activity which is unduly dangerous and in-
appropriate."9 This principle of strict liability was first enunciated in
Rylands v. Fletcher"0 with respect to the "non-natural" use of land.
The rationale for the rule has been stated as being either (1) the
assurance that the social consequences of uncompensated loss are dis-
tributed among the beneficiaries of the loss-causing activity;61 or (2)
the finding that the defendant's conduct contains fault aspects although
the unreasonable nature of the risk has been determined by the court
instead of a jury;62 or (3) the belief that the conduct represents a
conditional fault in the sense that society will permit the conduct
only if the actor will compensate the victims of its consequences. 63
In jurisdictions where the courts have pretended to reject Rylands v.
Fletcher, the same objective is achieved under the rubric of either
nuisance or absolute nuisance.64 Similiarly, recovery by an injured
workman against his employer is generally based upon a compensa-
tion scheme without reference to fault6" because ordinary negligence
law has been recognized as inadequate to meet the "social obligations
of modern industry."66 However, proof of the employer's negligence
is still required under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 7 and the
Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act)."
59. The Restatement of Torts refers to this as the principle of liability for ultra-
hazardous activities. RESTATEMENT Or TORTS § 519 (1934).
60. [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
61. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 56, at 794-95.
62. W. PROSSER, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELEc TED Topics ON
THE LAW Op TORTS 135, 185 (1953).
63. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. Rgv. 401 (1959).
64. W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 170.
65. The last two states to accept workmen's compensation were Arkansas and
Mississippi in 1940 and 1948, respectively. S. RiESENFLn & R. MAXWELL, MODERN
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 135-36 (1950).
Workmen's comoensation acts have been criticized on such grounds as the
inadequacy of compensation because of the ceilings put on the amount recoverable and
the lack of uniformity in shifting the cost to consumers. Witte, The Theory of
Workmen's Compensation, 1930 Am. LAB. LEG. RFv. 411.
66. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 123 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
67. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
68. 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-89 (1964). Both the Jones Act and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act are regarded as obsolete and uncivilized by a significant segment of
judicial sentiment. See, e.g., McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1954)
(dissenting opinion). With respect to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, there
has been a debate as to whether the Supreme Court has turned it into a system in
which liability is only nominally based on fault. See, e.g., Dennis v. Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R., 375 U.S. 208, 211 (1963) (Douglas & Harlan, J.J., dissenting);
[VOL. 14: p. 386
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By contrast, liability for harm from defective products was origi-
nally limited to parties in privity of contract,6 0 probably because it
was thought that the entrepreneur must be protected from the burden
of risk incident to the activities of the Industrial Revolution.7" How-
ever, this privity limitation has gradually disappeared during this
century and it is now sufficient that the harm was foreseeable.71 While
proof of the manufacturer's negligence is still required, there seems
to be a general tendency among courts to find liability even where
the fault principle would not truly apply, 72 although failure of such
proof has, in certain cases, resulted in escaping all liability.73 The
objective of fixing responsibility to reduce the hazards of the defec-
tive products has also been most effectively attained through con-
tract by extending the scope of the warranty to the ultimate con-
sumer, and not merely to the buyer.7 ' Liability for defective products
has also been extended to the retailer because he, like the manufac-
turer, occupies an integral part in the overall producing and market-
ing structure and should therefore bear a like portion of the liability.75
(b) The erosion of the fault system is also evident in the work-
ings of the system itself and is observable by independent analysis of
the requirements of a standard of care, scope of duty, the proof of
its breach, and causation. With respect to the standard of care, it
would appear that allowing a jury determination of a defendant's
standard of care tends to improve the chances of plaintiff's recovery.7"
Whereas a specific standard of conduct, worked out in detail by law,
tends to restrict liability either by reason of being applied as a maxi-
mum standard, rendering someone who has taken the defined pre-
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 366 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) ; id. at 74
(Jackson, J., dissenting). As to the practice of the Supreme Court of allowing jury
verdicts granting high awards to those protected by the federal statute to stand upon
a minimal showing of employer's fault, see De Parcq, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 1956-57 Term, 36 TXXAs L. Rlv. 145 (1957),
commented upon in Gee, A Dissenting Postscript or, Notes from Underground, 36
TEXAS L. Riv. 157 (1957).
69. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) ; Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
70. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 56, at 1535.
71. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Comment, Products Liability in Pennsylvania, 13 VILL. L. Rtv. 793, 794-98 (1968).
72. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
73. See, e.g., Ash v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 86, 120 N.E. 396 (1918).
74. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377
P.2d 897, 901 (1962) ; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
75. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
76. The plaintiff recovers in two-thirds to three-fourths of the negligence cases
tried before a jury. James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55
YALE L.J. 364, 374 & n.48 (1946). See also Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in
Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 476 & n.1 (1936).
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cautions beyond negligence, or by being applied as a minimum standard
of plaintiff's conduct and taking the issue of contributory negligence
away from the jury and rendering him negligent for not taking the
defined precautions.77  The trend away from the application of the
judge-made specific standards has been particularly evident since the
overruling of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman.7' Although once
widely sanctioned,79 a similar trend may be observed with respect to
the use as a defense of specific standards established by customs and
usages of an industry.80 The plaintiff, however, is still allowed to sug-
gest such customs and usages as an additional source of evidence of
negligence to increase his chances of getting to the jury.8' Similarly,
a majority of the courts take the position that an unexcused violation
of any applicable statutory standard is negligence per se, while a minor-
ity hold that the violation is only evidence of negligence which the
jury may accept or reject as it sees fit. 2
There has also been an extension of the scope of duty as a result
of a fuller application of the test of foreseeability of harm. An example
of this is seen in requiring the defendant to acquire a special knowl-
edge of implements or techniques he uses in his trade.83 Further, a
defendant, by putting himself in peril through his negligence, is held
to breach his duty to his rescuer who is injured in doing what is
reasonable to save the defendant, 4 and one is held under a duty to
rescue another in certain circumstances even in absence of his ante-
77. James, supra note 76, at 375.
78. 275 U.S. 66 (1927), overruled in Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U.S. 98(1934). See Hart v. Stence, 219 Iowa 55, 257 N.W. 434 (1934); Hogue v. Akin
Truck Line, 16 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1944); Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98
Utah 253, 98 P.2d 363 (1940) ; Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 P.
157 (1926); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 546 (1935); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 900, 901 (1933)
Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1493 (1929).
79. See, e.g., Kilbride v. Carbon Dioxide & Magnesia Co., 201 Pa. 552, 51 A. 347(1902) ; Lehigh Coal Co. v. Hayes, 128 Pa. 294, 18 A. 387 (1889) ; Schell v. Miller
N.B. Storage Co., 157 Pa. Super. 101, 42 A.2d 180 (1945).
80. See Polk v. Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1945) ; Cassanova v.
Paramount-Richards Theatres, 204 La. 813, 16 So. 2d 444 (1943) ; Lavelle v. Grace,
348 Pa. 175, 34 A.2d 498 (1943). Cf. Calley v. Boston & Me. R.R., 93 N.H. 359,
42 A.2d 329 (1945). See also Zesch v. Abrasive Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140
(1944). This view is of little significance where Workmen's Compensation statutes
have been enacted.
81. Higgins v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 129 Conn. 606, 30 A.2d 388 (1943);
Smith v. Thompson, 349 Mo. 396, 161 S.W.2d 232 (1942) ; cases cited note 80 supra.
See also Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147 (1942).
82. W. PROSSER & Y. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 249-52 (1962).
83. See Cornbrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, Inc., 282 N.Y. 217, 26 N.E.2d 25
(1940) ; Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944),
aff'd per curiam, 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945).
84. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944).
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cedent negligence 5  Since an actor is held to anticipate all that is
reasonably foreseeable, including negligent or criminal acts of third
persons, the last wrongdoer is not the only one held responsible;8"
the defendant may also have a duty to protect the plaintiff from fore-
seeable acts of third persons for whose conduct the defendant is not
otherwise responsible.8 7
With respect to the proof necessary to establish negligence, the
trend away from fault can be observed in the way courts administer
the requirements of such proof, particularly through the doctrine of
85. Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (1945). In L.S.
Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942), it was stated that
there may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect
the rescue of a person who is helpless and in a situation of peril, when the one
proceeded against is a master or an invitor or when the injury resulted from use
of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may
exist although the accident or original injury was caused by the negligence of the
plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of
the defendant. Other relationships may impose a like obligation ....
Id. at 95, 40 N.E.2d at 337. This type of special relationship is found in the duty of
a ship's captain to make all reasonable efforts to rescue a seaman who falls overboard.
See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). With respect to em-
ployers where employees suffer an injury during the course of employment, see
Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948) ; Carey v. Davis, 190
Iowa 720, 180 N.W. 889 (1921); Rival v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 62 N.M. 159, 306
P.2d 648 (1957). Between carrier and passenger, see Yu v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958) ; Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499,
108 N.E. 192 (1915). Where one has taken custody of another, or otherwise becomes
responsible for his safety, see Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955)(a jailor is responsible for the safety of his prisoner). Between husband and wife and
parent and child, a duty to aid has been recognized by the criminal law. See State v.
Zobel, 81 S.D. 260, 134 N.W.2d 101, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 833 (1965).
86. Kientz v. Charles Dennery, 17 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 1944) ; Cusatis v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 152 Pa. Super. 193, 31 A.2d 572 (1943). Cf. Yachuk v. Oliver Blais Co.,
[1944] 3 D.L.R. 615.
87. See In re Sabbatino & Co., 150 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Neering v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943) ; Rose v. City of Chicago, 317 Il1.
App. 1, 45 N.E.2d 717 (1942) ; Noll v. Marian, 347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943). The
duty to control the conduct of a third person may arise (i) where, due to their special
relationship, the defendant is required to take reasonable care to protect the plaintiff
from the conduct of third persons, e.g., the duty of a common carrier to its passengers,
Kinsey v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 130 N.J.L. 285, 32 A.2d 497 (1943) ; or
innkeeper to his guests; or owners of premises who hold them open to invitees, Peck
v. Gerber, 154 Or. 126, 59 P.2d 675 (1936) ; or employers to their employees in the
course of employment, or those who have custody of prisoners, or children; (ii)
where due to the defendant's special relationship with the third person, he has a power
of control over that person's actions, as in the relation of parent and child, Linder v.
Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; or the duty of an employer
to prevent his employees from throwing objects from his factory windows, Hogle v.
H.H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910) ; or the duty of the owner
of an automobile who is riding in it to control the conduct of the driver; or the duty
of those who have taken charge of dangerous lunatics, persons with contagious dis-
eases, and even criminals; or even the duty of the owner of land to use reasonable
care to prevent trespassers upon it from engaging in conduct dangerous to those
outside of it, De Ryss v. New York Cent. R.R., 275 N.Y. 85, 9 N.E.2d 788 (1937) ;(iii) where there are statutes establishing a duty to control, e.g., parents responsibility
for their children. In this regard, see Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children,
53 Ky. L.J. 254 (1965) ; Note, The New Jersey Parental Liability Statute. 39 TiMP.
L.Q. 177 (1966).
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res ipsa loquitur88 The doctrine is invoked where an accident would
not ordinarily occur without someone's negligence.5 9 Although not
always strictly applied,9" the requirement that the injury-producing
agency or instrumentality be under the exclusive control of the de-
fendant is a rational basis for finding that the negligence is that of the
defendant and not of someone else. 9 Sometimes, however, the matter
of probability has been overlooked or glossed over in the applica-
tion of the doctrine.92
Likewise, with respect to causation, much latitude is granted in
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence where the proof is circum-
stantial.93 Several states have solved the problem by adopting com-
parative negligence statutes. In addition, contributory negligence, it-
self a bar to recovery under the fault principle, is often treated by
juries as a form of comparative negligence, despite the court's in-
structions. 4 In the absence of comparative negligence statutes, the
defense of contributory negligence is often made unavailable in cer-
tain situations, such as willful and wanton misconduct" or absolute
nuisance created intentionally, but with no intent to cause injury.96
Furthermore, the defense of contributory negligence is often circum-
vented in a similar manner by the doctrine of the last clear chance, 7
or it may be unavailable under guest statutes. Moreover, in keeping
with the increased recognition of the social problems created by the
uncompensated loss,98 there has also been an attempt to place liability
88. See Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFPALo L. Rtv. 1 (1951);
James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur),
37 VA. L. REv. 179 (1951).
89. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ;
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal. 2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
90. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
91. Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Hickey, 137 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Highland Golf Club v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 59 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Iowa 1945) ; Bradley
v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941) ; Ortego v. Nehi
Bottling Works, 199 La. 599, 6 So. 2d 677 (1942); Lanza v. De Ridder Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 3 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 1941) ; Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 350 Mo.
431, 166 S.W.2d 575 (1942) ; Dunn v. Hoffman Bev. Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A.2d 352(1941) ; Nickisch v. Madison-34th St. Corp., 185 Misc. 25, 55 N.Y.S.2d 767 (New
York City Ct. 1944), aft'd, 185 Misc. 108, 55 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1945) ; Coralnick v.
Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 337 Pa. 344, 11 A.2d 143 (1940) ; McBride v. Paluxy Asphalt
Co., 164 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W.2d
1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
92. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489-90, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944);
Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1895).
93. James, supra note 76, at 393.
94. James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 721(1938); Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L.
Rev. 61, 62-66 (1945).
95. See, e.g., Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
96. See, e.g., Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931).
97. See generally James, supra note 94,
98. See, e.g., Krum v. Malloy 22 Cal. 2d 132, 137 P.2d 18 (1943); Souza v.
Corti, 22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645 (1943); Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal. App. 2d 503,
149 P.2d 76 (1944); Gutknecht v. Johnson, 62 Cal. App. 315, 144 P.2d 854 (1944).
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on financially responsible parties via such principles as vicarious re-
sponsibility or respondeat superior.99
Thus, while the 19th century marked the development of the fault
principle, the emerging trend seems to be toward its erosion in assessing
tort liability. While liability still rests largely upon the existence of
negligence or fault, other bases have been established in special cir-
cumstances. Liability has become contingent upon whether a person
ought to be responsible for the harm produced by his acts and, in
addition, a variety of principles have emerged to assign liability in
situations where it is believed that liability ought to be imposed even
where the fault principle would not permit it. The bases of liability
have been expanded and new rules of liability have been created.'00
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO AUTOMOBILE-ACCIDENT INJURY
The existing system of fault liability suffers from certain short-
comings which bring the system in question when it attempts to meet
the current problem of automobile accident injury. These shortcomings
include:
1. The limited use made of the tort system
2. The inadequacy of compensation
3. The maldistribution of compensation
4. The inefficacy of deterrence
5. The fault principle is a psychologically irrational concept
6. The fallacy of satisfying the community's moral standards
7. The inequities of the doctrine of contributory negligence
8. The problem of the financially irresponsible or immune de-
fendant
9. The delay in settlement
10. The unsatisfactory evidentiary requirements
11. The expense of litigation
99. For a general discussion, see C. GRSGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 703-09 (1959) ; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMAS, supra note 56, at 1361-74; Cohen,
Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
Rzv. 164, 176-78 (1964) ; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk
(pts. l&2), 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929) ; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability,
26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
100. See generally Carlston, Psychological and Sociological Aspects of the Judicial
and Arbitration Process, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LIBIR AMICORUM FOR
MARTIN DOMKS 44, 49-54 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
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1. The limited use made of the tort system
The tort liability system yields only 6 percent of the direct bene-
fits received from all principal reparation systems in the United States.
In comparison, workmen's compensation accounts for 5 percent, private
loss insurance 37 percent, formal sick leave 5 percent, social insurance
19 percent, public aid programs 24 percent, and miscellaneous sources
4 percent.'0 1 With respect to automobile injury reparation, the find-
ings of certain recent studies may be summarized as below:
TABLE 1
SOURCES OF REPARATION FOR AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT INJURIES
MICHIGAN NEW JERSEY STUDY
10 3
SOURCE STUDY' 0 2 (1958) (1955)
(PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Tort liability (insured and
uninsured)
Other party's insur-
32.42 ance
Other party person-
2.88 ally
24.42
59.72
Injured person's own in-
surance (hospital, med-
ical, burial, automobile,
other)
Miscellaneous (workmen's
compensation, social se-
curity)
Total
Respondent person-
ally
Total
37.07
Workmen's Compen-
sation temporary dis-
3.21 ability insurance
100.00
These studies indicate that tort liability accounts for only a little
more than half of all sources of automobile injury reparation. Only
about half of the injured persons receiving compensation receive re-
covery from tort liability settlements, as is evident from the follow-
ing table:
101. CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ & BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS
AND PAYMENTS 59 (1964) [hereinafter cited as AACP].
102. Id. at 63.
103. See Bureau of Economic & Business Research, A Comparative Analysis of
Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to Automobile Accidents: Various Hypotheses -
New Jersey, 1955, 12 TEMPLE U. ECON. & Bus. BULL., Mar. 1960, table 36 at 38.
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TABLE 2
INJURED PERSONS RECEIVING COMPENSATION
MICHIGAN NEW JERSEY STUDY 1 05
SOURCE STUDY1°4 (1958) (1955)
(PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Tort liability settlements Other party's insur-
34.64 ance
Other party person-
3.93 ally
Respondent person-
21.46 ally
60.03
Injured person's own in-
surance (automobile,
medical, life, burial,
other)
Miscellaneous (employer,
including sick leave,
workmen's compensa-
tion, social security or
other pensions, other)
Total
63
6
118106
33.80
Temporary disability
or unemployment in-
2.17 surance
Workmen's compen-
2.38 sation
Other and unknown
1.68 sources
6.23
100.06
Thus, only about half of the injured persons receiving compensa-
tion resort to tort law, and only slightly more than half of all com-
pensation received by them comes from tort law. Actually, the financial
contribution of the non-tort sources may reasonably be surmised as
more than half, as is indicated in the studies included above, because
the growth has been more rapid in the total social security and health
programs than in the tort liability programs, and because future
benefits are not fully included in the above studies.'
Furthermore, of all persons suffering losses, 14 percent hire at-
torneys, 0.6 percent commence trial, and 0.1 percent appeal to a higher
104. AACP, supra note 101, table 4-8 at 146.
105. Bureau of Economic & Business Research, supra note 103, table 19 at 26.
106. The total exceeds 100 percent because many persons reported more than one
source of reparation.
107. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MIcH. L. lRv.
279, 288-89 (1964).
Total
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court.10 8 Even in instances where the victim suffers serious injury," 9
only 49 percent hire attorneys, only 5 percent commence trial, and
only 0.5 percent appeal to a higher court."' Thus, it is apparent that
less than half of them come in contact with the legal system, less than
a tenth with the trial process, and less than a hundredth with the ap-
pellate process.
2. The inadequacy of compensation
Compensation of the injured person is one of the goals of tort
law."' However, all significant studies of automobile accident injuries
point out the inadequacy of the tort law system in compensating the
injured. The Columbia-sponsored Committee to Study Compensation
for Automobile Accidents, for example, found in 1932 that an injured
person had only about one chance in four of receiving any compensa-
tion where there was no insurance." 2 Where payment was received
in most cases it usually covered neither the present nor the future
economic loss. Less than one-third of the registered automobiles were
insured against liability. 3 and although some compensation was re-
ceived in 85 percent of the cases where the injuring party was insured,
the payment matched the present economic loss only in three-fourths
of the temporary disability cases" 4 and often failed to cover the loss
in cases resulting in permanent disability or death." 5 This inadequacy
of compensation would appear even more glaring if the study had
computed and reflected future losses.
A study made by the University of Wisconsin Law School in
1935 found that the injured person had little chance of recovery
where the automobile operator was uninsured; and where the oper-
ator was insured, the recovery was adequate for slight injuries, but
108. AACP, supra note 101, fig. 4-3 at 155, fig. 7-2 at 241.
109. The injury is considered serious where the victim has either medical expenses
in excess of $500, is hospitalized for at least two weeks, suffers a permanent impair-
ment, or dies.
110. AACP, supra note 101, at 184, 241.
111. For an historical discussion on the use of monetary compensation, see W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51-52 (3d ed. 1923). It has been sug-
gested that there should be a shift in emphasis from compensation to rehabilitation
of accident victims. See M. SCHULZINGER, THE ACCIDENT SYNDROME: THE GENESIS
or ACCIDENTAL INJURY 218 (1956).
112. COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT
TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 75
(1932) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA STUDY]. For a discussion of the committee
report, see James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents:
An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 409 (1959). See also Corstvet, The
Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1936) ;
Smith, Lilly & Dowling, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 785 (1932).
113. COLUMBIA STUDY, supra note 112, at 203.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id. at 205.
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inadequate for serious injuries. "' Similar findings were obtained in
a study conducted by the Yale Law School in 1951 in which it was
shown that 70 percent of the victims who had to rely on the uninsured
operator for recovery received no compensation, while in 80 percent
of the cases involving an insured operator the payment covered the
losses." 7 A study made by the University of Pennsylvania in 1959-60
found that tort law compensated for only one-half of the victim's
tangible loss in 52 percent of the cases, while 35 to 45 percent of the
victims remained uncompensated."' The Columbia University Project
for Effective Justice in 1960 studied the problem of compensation for
all accidents in New York City, including automobile accidents, and
found that approximately 84 percent of all claimants received some
payment, but the majority of recoveries were $1,000 or less. More-
over, attorney's fees reduced the amount recovered by 36 percent. "
Finally, the latest quantitative study of the problem at the time
of this writing, conducted by the Law School and the Survey Research
Center of the University of Michigan and published in 1964, reinforced
the earlier research by reporting that only 49 percent of those who
sustained injury received some reparation through the tort law proc-
ess.' More than half of the serious injury victims received sub-
stantially less than their economic loss, or nothing at all ;121 and
two-thirds of the persons with severe economic losses recovered less
than one-fourth of such losses. 122 Thus, it would appear that the tort
law process has failed to provide adequate compensation for injuries
to automobile accident victims.
3. The inaldistribution of compensation
Compensation has not only been inadequate, but has also been
erratically distributed. Injured persons with small losses tend to re-
cover in full or in excess, while those with large or staggering losses
tend to receive either less than their loss or nothing at all. The
Columbia Study of 1932 confirmed this observation. Those who suf-
fered the most trivial injuries and needed compensation the least usually
received it in full since it was cheaper for the insurance companies
116. The study is reported in Brown, Automobile Accident Litigation in Wisconsin:
A Factual Study, 10 Wis. L. Rnv. 170 (1935).
117. Details of this study appear in James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident
Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70, 75 (1952).
118. This study is reported in Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile
Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. Riv. 913 (1962).
119. For the details of the study, see Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money
and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM.
L. Rev. 1 (1961).
120. AACP, supra note 101, at 139, 147.
121. Id., fig. 5-12 at 178.
122. Id., fig. 5-13 at 179.
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to settle than fight small claims, whereas compensation was usually
inadequate for larger claims. 1 3 The Pennsylvania study of 1959-60
found that the awards were more than double the tangible losses in 33
percent of the cases, more than five times in 18 percent of the cases,
and in only 7.3 percent of the cases did they coincide with the actual
loss. Again, the payment exceeded the loss where the loss was trivial.
For example, in cases of persons suffering a tangible loss of less than
$100, 57.3 percent received nothing, 33.1 percent recovered five times
their loss or better, 6.4 percent received between two and five times
their loss, and 3.2 percent received an award which was less than
double the loss. On the other hand, in 13.7 percent of the fatal cases,
the survivors received neither award nor benefit from other sources,
and in 17.8 percent of such cases the total of award and benefit left
the survivor with unreimbursed losses of more than $800.124 The
Michigan study also found that persons with the least significant losses
recovered the largest multiple of offsetting claims, while the recipients
of serious losses received the smallest fraction. Thus, 32 percent of
the persons in the lowest group of losses (under $1,000) received
more than 11/2 times their economic loss, whereas only 5 percent of
the persons with the highest losses (over $25,000) had such a high
ratio. 25 In the former group, about half of the victims were fully
compensated for their economic losses and a third of them recovered
substantially more than their losses; while in the latter group virtu-
ally no one received full compensation and nearly three-fourths failed
to recover even one-fourth of their losses.1
26
4. The inefficacy of deterrence
It is claimed that tort law offers deterrence to socially undesir-
able conduct by imposing the burden of liability on those at fault, by
depriving them of the right to collect from anyone, and by conferring
compensation on those free from fault. Liability is imposed as a
sanction to discourage harmful behavior;27 but the deterrent poten-
123. See COLUMBIA STUDY, supra note 112, at 266-68. See also James, supra note
112, at 409 & n.12.
124. Morris & Paul, supra note 118, at 918-19 & n.9.
125. AACP, supra note 101, fig. 5-13 at 179.
126. Id., fig. 6-14 at 197.
127. Justice Jackson noted in his dissenting opinion in Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953), that[t]raditionally, one function of civil liability for negligence is to supply a sanction
to enforce the degree of care suitable to the conditions of contemporary society
and appropriate to the circumstances of the case. The civil damage action,
prosecuted and adjusted by private initiative, neither burdening our overworked
criminal processes nor confined by the limits of criminal liability, is one of the
law's most effective inducements to the watchfulness and prudence necessary to
avoid calamity from hazardous operations in the midst of an unshielded populace.
Id. at 49. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 56, at 744-58; C. GREGORY
& H. KALVEN, supra note 99, at 690-702.
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tial of such liability in automobile accident cases is doubtful for three
principal reasons.
First, automobile accidents are not usually caused by moral blame-
worthiness, conscious indifference, or deliberate carelessness.12 If
this conclusion is accurate, the threat of liability, aimed at making the
driver more careful, would not have the effect of deterring accidents.
in fact, a threat of liability may have an opposite effect by increasing
excessive nervousness or panic where these are the dominating causes
of accidents.129 Second, in nearly half the cases in which reparation
was received by the victims of automobile accidents, lack of fault has
not been a pre-requisite to receiving benefits. These benefits have been
received from such sources as collision, health, life, and social in-
surance.'30  Third, the tortfeasor in an automobile accident is gen-
erally insulated from liability through the existence of liability in-
surance,'' the absence of assets or, if the tortfeasor is a wage-earner,
by the ability to file a petition in bankruptcy on the day after an action
in negligence is filed.' 32 Nearly 85 percent of the automobile owners
in the United States carry liability insurance; 33 and as the Michigan
study indicates, only 3 percent of the defendants pay any part of the
settlement from their own pockets."14  In a third of the cases where
a suit is filed and settled, the defendant does not even know whether
anything has been paid to the victim or the claimant.' 3
5
128. Bristol, Medical Aspects of Accident Control, 107 J.A.M.A. 653, 654 (1936).
129. AACP, supra note 101, at 89.
130. Id. at 138-39, 151.
131. Certain writers have argued that the protection which the insured receives
through insurance may remove the financial deterrence against negligent acts.
McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 26, 31 (1941).
Ehrenzweig points out that
any liability insurance, be it compulsory or voluntary, has always presented a
policy problem since it offers protection to the insured against the consequences of
his own wrong. Indeed, this type of insurance was originally considered invalid
on this moral ground, and became acceptable only because it was soon recognized
that in most cases the liability insured against was based upon morally blameless,
though technically faulty, reactions or even upon entirely unavoidable conse-
quences of modern traffic conditions; or, in other words, because "negligence"
liability in automobile cases proved to be a liability for "negligence without fault."
Automobile liability insurance thus purports to protect against liability for the
very "fault" whose absence in most cases has made such insurance permissible.
A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR rHe TRAFFIC VICTIM 10-11 (1954)
(footnotes omitted). He contends that the "present liability insurance, then, for the
victim's sake, covers both guilty and innocent actions alike. For this reason it must
be a threat to the same safety and to the same promotion of care that the insurance
industry has come to stress so effectively in defending the present system." Id. at 19
(footnote omitted). Green remarked that "[t]he very fact of insurance may throw
light on a driver's willingness to take a chance." Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33
TEXAS L. REv. 157, 162 (1954).
132. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a, 63a(7), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35a, 103a(7) (1964).
133. AACP, supra note 101, at 90.
134. Id. at 302.
135. Id., table 8-17 at 297.
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These three factors strongly suggest that tort liability cannot be
relied upon as a deterrent to automobile accidents; and the problem
ought to be approached with this in mind.
5. The fault principle is a psychologically irrational concept
According to certain observers, the fault principle of tort liability
reflects the need for aggressive satisfaction, and is not designed to be
a rational allocation of losses. 13 6 While, as noted earlier, primitive
law imposed liability for causation rather than fault, the law in the
19th century moved away from causation to fault as a basis for lia-
bility. Some observers view this as a shift from the irrational to the
rational,"3 7 while others find the development devoid of rationality. 3 1
Primitive law was unwilling to accept a harm as unintentional,3 9
for the primitive animistic mind was concerned with intention and was
not disposed to accept the harmful impact of either nature or man as
a blameless occurrence, even though the harm was accidental. 4 ' There
was a subconscious guilt for which revenge, feud, and other legal sanc-
tions were imposed without proof of wrongful intent. When fault
became the basis of liability, the primitive urge to find a will behind
causation still remained, and the actor was presumed guilty until he
"be judged utterly without his fault."'' Since it was apparent that
not all causation of harm was another man's wrongful intent, a new
basis of liability emerged under the rubric of negligence. This negli-
gence, in psychological terms, suggests at least the actor's subconscious
intent, i.e., that he should have known the harmfulness of his conduct.
Thus, although the standard of conduct was to be conceived objec-
tively, the new negligence retained the implication of blame for sub-
conscious fault. When in the 19th century the courts were faced with
the need to encourage enterprise in the wake of the industrial revolu-
tion, they resorted to the principle of fault liability; and when a need
arose for broadening the bases of liability, it was largely met by in-
sistence upon the fault principle and not by devising non-fault means
of loss allocation. Therefore, even where there was no fault in the moral
136. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 24.
137. See, e.g., Wigmore, supra note 1.
138. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 24, at 859.
139. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. Rev. 37 (1926).
140. See, e.g., C. CALISSM, A HISTORY 0F ITALIAN LAW 227 (1928).
141. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1618). As Ehrenzweig points out:
True, the law came to believe the killer who swore that the deadly blow had
been unintentional. But it insisted at least on the payment of a fine. And in cases
of "misadventure" though the king waived his wite, and the killer had a "pardon
of course," the bot remained payable to the injured. In Chinese law accidental
parricide is, or was until recently, a capital crime; and even the Church with her
early stress on the actor's motive, while later permitting complete exculpation by
the plea of accident, long continued to impose punishment for homicidium casuale.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 24, at 861.
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sense, fictions and presumptions were indulged in to find fault, some-
times called pseudo-fault.' 42
Such insistence on fault seems to reflect, in psychological terms,
the need of the punishing aggressor for satisfaction in aggression
against the wrongdoer, and not a rational basis of allocation of losses
from the injury. Thus plaintiff's vindictiveness is served, and since
coercion produces feelings of guilt, the guilt of the defendant makes
these feelings bearable and legitimizes the plaintiff's pleasure at his
own aggression. The fault concept thus appears to be based on an
irrational desire for relief from guilt feelings arising from plaintiff's
coercive aggression; and it is therefore suggested that the consequent
chaos of law is only tolerated because of a masochistic tendency of
self-punishment.
4 3
6. The fallacy of satisfying the community's moral standards
The fault system is supposedly designed to satisfy the commu-
nity's moral standards by imposing liability on one for his personal
moral shortcoming and by protecting those who have been free from
it. Consequently, when there is no one at fault it is deemed only
fair that the loss lie where it falls.' This moral argument for the
fault system is subject to erosion when applied to automobile acci-
dents in at least three ways.
First, legal fault does not entirely coincide with moral fault. It
is not the actor's personal equation, but an external standard of
conduct which determines his fault in law. While it is sometimes
contended that by and large the two coincide, 145 when the scope of per-
sonal blameworthiness is slight in comparison with other accident-
causing factors, the two faults would not seem to coincide even re-
motely. 46
Second, liability is imposed under the negligence principle when
the actor's conduct falls below the standard of the reasonable man,
irrespective of whether he may have performed to the best of his own
abilities. His shortcoming due to awkwardness, low intelligence, poor
judgment etc., may explain why his conduct fell below the commu-
nity standards; but he is still held liable. 147 If the negligent actor has
142. For some examples, see A. EHRENZWnIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
143. Ehrenzweig, supra note 24, at 869.
144. O.W. HOLMES, THe COMMON LAW 94 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Ames, supra
note 57, at 100; Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability - Suggested Changes in Classifi-
cation, 30 HARV. L. REv. 241, 259 (1917) ; Smith, Lilly & Dowling, Compensation for
Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32 COLUM. L. Rsv. 803, 805 (1932).
145. P. LANDON, POLLACK'S LAW or TORTS 8 (14th ed. 1939) ; Smith, supra note
144, at 254-55.
146. Bristol, Medical Aspects of Accident Control, J.A.M.A. 653, 654 (1936).
147. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 144, at 107-09; James, The Qualities of the
Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
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used the best judgment of which he is capable, it would seem that he
would not be morally at fault; he may, nevertheless, be at fault in
the eyes of the law.
Third, the moral argument also seems to lack merit under the
existing system because of the ineffectiveness of the chastisement of
the tortfeasor. There are at least two reasons for this ineffectiveness:
(1) he may not have any assets which can be reached, or they may
otherwise be protected;148 and (2) he is generally insulated from lia-
bility by virtue of liability insurance, which is carried by nearly 85
percent of the automobile owners. 4 The consequences of this insu-
lation are that the supposed moral chastisement of the tortfeasor is
rendered ineffective and the burden of loss falls on the "right-doers"' 150
and not the wrongdoers.
7. The inequities of the doctrine of contributory negligence
Under the existing system, the injured victim is completely fore-
closed from compensation when he has been contributorily negligent. 5 '
It should, however, be noted that some states have attempted to rectify
this situation by adopting comparative negligence statutes which are
similar in effect to the civil law doctrine of dividing the loss.'52 Where
such statutes have not been enacted juries have generally tended to
discount the defense of contributory negligence. 15 3
The argument for retaining contributory negligence as a defense
to recovery for automobile accident injuries consists of the deterrent
rationale and the moral rationale. The deterrent rationale theorizes
that the denial of compensation to the contributorily negligent vic-
tim will promote highway safety by making the potential victim take
greater care for his own safety. However, since the person charged
with contributory negligence takes risks with his own safety, and not
with the safety of others, it would appear that if he is not deterred
by fear for his own safety, then he will not be so deterred by the fear
148. E.g., if he is a wage earner, he may protect his wages by filing a petition
in bankruptcy after an action for negligence is filed. Bankruptcy Act §§ 17a, 63a(7),
11 U.S.C. §§ 35a, 103a(7) (1964).
149. AACP, supra note 101, at 90.
150. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MIcH. L. R.v.
279, 292 (1964).
151. For a general discussion, see Green, The Individual's Protection Under
Negligence Law: Risk Sharing, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 751, 757 (1953) ; James, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. Rsv. 340 (1954) ; James, Contributory Negligence,
62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953) ; Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,
41 ILL. L. Riv. 151 (1946); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases
(pts. 1&2), 99 U. PA. L. Riv. 572, 766 (1951).
152. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIM. L. Riv. 1 (1953) ; Snow,
Comparative Negligence, 1953 INs. L.J. 235.
153. Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. R~v. 1(1946).
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of losing damages otherwise recoverable from a potential defendant.
In fact, some observers suggest that the defense of contributory negli-
gence actually reduces the effect of deterrence on potential defen-
dants.' Moreover, even if the doctrine had a deterrent effect the lesson
learned from litigation would come too late to be effective. Also, the
years of delay before judgment would tend to shield the mind of the
injured party from any deterrent effect the court's decision might
have.'55 The moral rationale of the argument for retaining contribu-
tory negligence is that a contributorily negligent victim should not
to be allowed to recover because he himself has been at fault.' 56 Con-
siderable doubt is cast on this theory because, as mentioned previously,
moral blameworthiness in the occurrence of an accident is relatively
insignificant.
8. The problem of the financially irresponsible or immune defendant
Under the existing system the personal injury suit becomes a
worthless remedy, even where the defendant's fault is proven if he is
financially irresponsible due to inadequate insurance and insufficient
assets subject to seizure. The accident victim is also left without a
remedy if the tortfeasor enjoys immunity from suit such as exist for
government agencies, 57 or charitable institutions, although the latter
immunity is being questioned with respect to business charities. 5"
A similar immunity often exists for certain close relatives, although
some courts have permitted recovery to children or wives upon their
fathers' and husbands' liability policy.5 9
9. The delay in settlement
The time lag which prevails under the existing legal machinery
between the time of the injury and the time the victim secures com-
154. Cohen, Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California,
12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 164, 188 (1964).
155. Netherton, Highway Safety Under Different Types of Liability Legislation,
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 110, 113 (1954).
156. See pp. 405-06 supra.
157. Ehrenzweig, "Full-Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim - A Voluntary
Compensation Plan, 43 CALIv. L. Rgv. 1, 5 (1955); English, Automobile Insurance
for Municipalities, 1950 INs. L.J. 807; Marx, Conpulsory Compensation Insurance,
25 COLUM. L. REv. 164, 169-70 (1925) ; Miller, Personal Injury Litigation in School
Cases, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 60 (1955) ; Symposium, Government Tort Liability,
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1321 (1954).
158. See Green, supra note 151, at 760. See also Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232
P.2d 241 (1951) ; Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
159. See Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in Conflict of
Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PnI'. L. Rtv. 397, 398 (1954) ;
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE
L.J. 548, 553 (1948).
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pensation is another weakness of the system.16 ° The effects of this
delay are at least threefold. First, financial difficulties may bring frus-
tration and misery to the victim or his family because between the
time of injury and financial recovery, the victim's income ceases but
his expenses most often continue and sometimes increase because of
additional medical treatment. The delay thus exacts a heavy toll in
terms of frustration and financial difficulties, vitiating the relief which
is finally obtained, especially where compensation is urgently needed
and the recovery sought is virtually the only source of funds. An
additional repercussion of this period of delay is that the victim may
hesitate to obtain the fullest desirable medical treatment, fearing the
inability to pay his bills when they come due.1"' Second, the delay
and the consequent financial pressures often coerce the victim into
accepting a quick, and sometimes inadequate, settlement from the in-
surance carrier, rather than looking for a larger recovery at trial. The
need for subsistence and the need to escape the continued anxiety of
litigation thus combine to make the victim accept a settlement for less
than his economic loss.' 62 Third, the delay in litigation tends to pro-
mote perjury and innocent misrepresentation of parties and witnesses
who are asked to recall the details of an accident years after its
occurrence.
163
Many studies have noted this delay. As early as 1925 it was
observed that an inevitable delay of 1 to 5 years existed where a
legal action was brought for recovery, and if the plaintiff won the
suit there was likely to be an additional delay of 2% years before
receiving satisfaction. The delay did not result from the sluggishness
of the courts, but from the system itself, which involves a period of
waiting before filing suit, followed by pleadings, trials, and appellate
reviews before final judgment is reached. 64 The Columbia study of
1932 found the delay to be from 1 to 3 years;165 while a 1962 Con-
necticut study found that nearly half the cases involving an injured
wage-earner and an insured defendant were still being litigated after
160. Contra, Ames, The Automobile Accident Proposal: An Irrational Concept,
14 U. FLA. L. Rsrv. 398, 402-06 (1962). For a brief history of the subject, see
H. Z8ISEL, H. KALVtN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
161. AACP, supra note 101, at 221; Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus
in the Automobile Injury Impasse, 52 A.B.A.J. 533, 537 (1966) ; Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, supra note 119, at 3; Marx, supra note 157, at 174; Morris & Paul, supra
note 118, at 924.
162. AACP, supra note 101, at 221; Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and
Its Consequences, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 466, 468-69; Ehrenzweig, supra note 157,
at 7-8; Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 119, at 3; McNiece & Thornton, Auto-
mobile Accident Prevention and Compensation, 27 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 585, 590 (1952).
163. Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 8; Green, supra note 151, at 763.
164. See Marx, supra note 157, at 174.
165. See COLUMBIA STUDY, supra note 112, at 205, 278-80.
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2/ years. 6 It was likewise observed in New York in 1952 that, de-
pending on the county involved, delay in the trial of tort jury cases
ranged from 1 to 4 years. 67 Additionally, substantial delays were
also found in many federal courts.' A 1959 study observed
that personal injury suits accounted for nearly 60 percent of all new
issues filed in the New York Supreme Court, for more than half of
the cases brought in the law divisions of the New Jersey Superior
and County courts, and for 49 percent of all private civil cases in the
federal courts. This mass of litigation involving thousands of people
caused a delay of 2 or more years in recovery with no one knowing
how many victims had accepted a lesser settlement in order to shorten
the waiting period for payment.' 69 Similarly, according to a study
published in 1961, 64 percent of the attorney-handled cases were closed
within 1 year, and 82 per cent within 2 years. If the non-attorney
cases are included in the statistics, 71 percent of all cases would be
closed within 1 year, and 86 percent within 2 years.' 0 The Pennsyl-
vania study of 1962 showed that it took more than a year to reach
a result in a majority of cases where there was an award at all and
that it took more than 3 years in a substantial number of cases, par-
ticularly in those cases which involved plaintiffs in the lowest income
group."' The Michigan study of 1964 found that 31 percent of serious
injury cases were settled in up to 6 months, 27 percent were settled
in 6 to 12 months, 20 percent were settled in 1 to 2 years and 22
percent were settled in 2 years or more. In cases where a law suit
166. See James & Law, supra note 117, at 77.
167. McNiece & Thornton, supra note 162, at 588-89 & nn.13-17.
168. The median time from filing to disposition of civil cases involving a trial was
3 years in the Southern District of New York; from issue to trial 2 years in the
District of Columbia; from issue to disposition 2 years in the District of New Jersey;
from filing to disposition 11/., years in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and in
the Northern District of Illinois; and about 1 year in the Eastern District of Michigan.
McNiece & Thornton, supra note 162, at 589-90; Stephens, The Administrative Affairs
of the U.S. Courts: A Report to the Bar, 38 A.B.A.J. 555, 559, 560 (1952). See also
Note, Calendar Congestion in the Southern District of New York, 51 COLUM. L. REv.
1037 (1951).
169. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation,
59 COLUM. L. REv. 1115, 1115-17 (1959). See also Brennan, New Jersey Tackles
Court Congestion, 40 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 45, 46 (1956).
170. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 119, at 30-31.
171. Morris & Paul, supra note 118, at 923 n.18. The authors of this study found
that the length of time between accident and settlement in cases where injuries in-
capacitated the victim for at least one full day as follows:
Economic Group of Injured Persons
Length of Time Low Middle High
Under 6 months 29% 36% 34%
6 months to 1 year 17% 16% 5%
1 year to 3 years 28% 36% 44%
3 years or more .26% 12% 17%
100% 100% 100%
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was involved the majority took from 1 to 3 years to settle, though more
promptness was evident in smaller settlements. 172  The proportion of
cases with a longer delay was higher among those which went to trial
than among all cases."'
A closer examination of the factor of delay reveals certain in-
teresting correlations. For example, sometimes delay depended upon
the court in which the attorney filed suit. 17" There is slightly less
delay when a specialist attorney handles the case than when a non-
specialist is involved, 175 while delay increases with the presence of
extra attorneys. 176 A correlation is also found between delay and the
stage of disposition - i.e., it takes longer to close the suits than
the claims 177 and the proportion of cases with longer delay is higher
among cases which go to trial than among the total of all of them.178
An important correlation is also found to exist between delay and the
extent of economic loss caused by the injury from the automobile acci-
dent. Generally speaking, the greater the loss, the greater is the delay.
Thus, as the Michigan study reveals, when the economic loss is under
$1,000, the case is most promptly settled. One-fourth of the cases in this
category are settled within a year, and nearly three-fourths of them
within 2 years. However, when the economic loss grows to between
$1,000 and $5,000 only one-fifth of the cases are settled within a year
and only about one-half within 2 years; and when the loss is between
$5,000 and $25,000, less than one-tenth of the cases are settled within
172. AACP, supra note 101, at 221-22, 242.
173. According to AACP, the time from injury to settlement in cases which came
to trial compared with all cases in which a settlement was obtained, was as follows:
Up to 1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years 3 years or more
All Cases -.. --.-............. 20% 34% 31% 15%
Cases which came to trial- 16% 17% 42% 25%
Id., fig. 7-4 at 243. Trial was found, however, not to be always and inevitably a delay-
ing factor. Id. at 243.
174. Rosenberg & Sovern, supra note 169, at 1151-52.
175. Franklin, Chanin, and Mark found in their study that in the $1,000 and under
group, 69 percent of the specialist-handled cases closed within 1 year and 87 percent
within 2 years, whereas these percentages were 68 and 84, respectively, for the cases
handled by non-specialists. In the $1,001-$3,000 group, 67 percent of the specialist-
handled cases closed within 1 year and 85 percent within 2 years, whereas these per-
centages were 61 and 69, respectively, for the cases handled by non-specialists. Franklin,
Chanin & Mark, supra note 119, at 32 n.156.
176. Id. at 31 n.155. In the $1,000 or under group, 39 percent of the cases involving
an extra attorney closed within 1 year, compared to 49 percent of the cases involving
a single attorney which closed during that period. In the $1,001-$3,000 group, the
respective percentages were 34 and 48. Id.
177. E.g., after 1 year 90 percent of the claims, but only 43 percent of suits, closed.
After 2 years, 97 percent of all claims and 71 percent of all suits had closed. Id.
at 31 n.152.
178. See note 173 supra.
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a year, and only one-third within 2 years.179  A similar correlation
exists between delay and the amount of settlement. Thus, in settle-
ments for less than $1,000, 58 percent are made within 6 months and
86 percent within a year; but in settlements for $1,000 to $2,000,
only 28 percent are made within 6 months and 58 percent within a
year.' Similar results were obtained in another study where it was
found that 68 percent of those cases involving $1,000 or less were
closed within 1 year and 85 percent within 2 years, whereas of those
cases with recovery of more than $3,000 only 20 percent were closed
within 1 year and 40 percent within 2 years.'8 ' Thus, all the studies
would appear to indicate that the larger the economic loss or amount
of settlement, the greater the delay in recovery.
10. The unsatisfactory evidentiary requirements
Certain observers have found it ironic that the fault system has
been abolished with respect to injuries to workmen even though
the injured workman is at least sure of a financially responsible de-
fendant and easily obtainable witnesses; at the same time, there is
no guaranty of financial responsibility for injuries from an automobile
accident and the injured victim is not so easily able to secure
witnesses.1 2
The average developmental time of an automobile accident is esti-
mated at less than ten seconds,' 83 yet a witness is often asked to recall
the event after more than a year has passed. The accuracy of this re-
call tends to be vitiated by several factors. There may have been dis-
179. AACP shows the time from injury to settlement in cases of varying economic
loss as follows (percentage distribution of cases in which a settlement was obtained) :
Amount of loss Up to 1 year Up to 1-2 years Up to 2-3 years 3 years or more
$ 1- 999 - 25% 47% 17% 11%
1,000- 4,999 - 19% 33% 36% 12%
5,000-24,999 - 9% 25% 32% 34%
25,000 or more- 10% 32% 46% 12%
Id., fig. 7-5, at 245.
180. AACP shows the time from injury to settlement, for settlements of various
amounts, as follows (percentage distribution of serious injury cases in which a tort
settlement was obtained) :
Amount of settlement Up to 6 months 6-12 months 1-2 years 2 years or more
$ 1- 999 58% 28% 10% 4%
1,000-2,999 - 28% 30% 19% 23%
3,000-9,999 - 13% 20% 31% 36%
10,000 or more ___ 31% 28% 12% 29%
Id., fig. 6-29 at 223.
181. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 119, at 31.
182. Marx, supra note 157, at 169.
183. A report of the World Health Organization, cited in Marshall, The Unreality
of Accident Litigation: A Plea for a New Approach, 50 A.B.A.J. 713, 714 (1964).
For a discussion of the legal effect of this short time span, see Peterson v. Burk-
halter, 38 Cal. 2d 107, 237 P.2d 977 (1951).
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tortion in initial perception, due to the conditioning of this perception
by the witnesses' personality or the tendency to associate himself with
his subjectively determined "good side" in an adversary proceeding.
This objectivity may be further vitiated by the witnesses' commit-
ment to his version of the story developed by having to repeat it several
times before and during the trial, and by his anxiety not to contradict
himself.'
Moreover, the evidence which the jury is permitted to receive
on one hand allows their vindictive emotions to be manipulated, 8 5
while on the other hand keeps their knowledge of pertinent factors
less than replete by virtue of rules which forbid the defendant's counsel
to tell them that the plaintiff's damages would be tax exempt, 8 6 that
the defendant is wealthy"' or that he carries insurance.88  These
objections are separate and distinct from the question of how much, if
at all, these rules take into account the psychology of the jury.18 9
Certain writers have attempted to apologize for these shortcom-
ings in the evidentiary requirements of the existing system with re-
spect to automobile injury litigation by pointing out that all adjudi-
cation is vulnerable to such deficiencies.' 90 However, true as this may
be, it would not appear to mitigate these criticisms.
11. The expense of litigation
Many studies reveal the expensive nature of the existing system.
For example, the Columbia study of 1932 found that a plaintiff with-
out means, who must of necessity employ counsel on a contingent fee
basis, received only one-half or three-fourths of the amount recovered.'
184. See Staton, Psychological Factors Influencing Jury Trials, 13 FFD. INS.
COUNCIL Q. 91 (1963).
185. Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 6-7.
186. E.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 349 Ill. App. 75, 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953).
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 7.
187. For an ideological discussion in this connection, see Ehrenzweig, Assurance
Oblige - A Comparative Study, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 445 (1950).
188. E.g., Squires v. Riffle, 211 Cal. 370, 295 P. 517 (1931). See also Sutton,
Insurance is Prejudicial, 16 TENN. B.J. 63 (1953) ; Walker, Indemnity Insurance in
Damage Actions, 21 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 227 (1948) ; Comment, Disclosure of Insurer's
Interest in Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Illinois, 43 ILL. L. Rzv. 650 (1943)
Comment, Evidence of Liability Insurance in Texas, 29 TEXAS L. Rtv. 949 (1951);
Comment, Interrogation of Jurors as to Connections with Insurance Companies, 15
U. CHI. L. Riv. 986 (1948). But cf. Odegard v. Connolly, 211 Minn. 342, 1 N.E.2d
137 (1941).
189. See generally Baer, The Relative Roles of Legal Rules and Non-Legal Factors
in Accident Litigation, 31 N.C.L. REv. 46 (1952) ; Broeder, The Functions of the
Jury: Facts or Fictions, 21 U. CHI. L. R~v. 386 (1954) ; Green, supra note 130; James,
Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949).
190. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem - Auto
Compensation Plans, 31 U. CnI. L. REV. 641, 647-48 (1964).
191. COLUMBIA S'rUDY, supra note 112, at 205-06.
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A similar conclusion can be drawn from a Wisconsin study of 1935.192
And a Pennsylvania study of 1953 also pointed out the high col-
lection expenses involved in recovery. 193 According to an Illinois study
of 1962, more money was spent on the legal expenses arising from
automobile accidents than for medical treatment.194 A study made in
1961 of the economics of personal injury litigation in New York
showed that attorney's fees took 36 percent of the amount recovered.' 9 '
A New Jersey study of 1955 also indicated high collection expenses.' 96
The Michigan study of 1964 found that the collection expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees, amounted to nearly one-fourth (24.6 percent)
of the reparation received. 197
The operating costs of the tort system, which would include the
costs of selling and administering insurance, the costs of keeping
courts open for automobile injury cases, and the costs of attorneys'
fees, stood at 120 percent of the net amount of benefits received by
the injured persons. 9 ' In contrast, the costs of private loss insurance
systems (primarily life and health insurance) amounted to about 22
percent of the net benefits,' 99 the costs of some Blue Cross systems 5
percent, and the costs of social security programs only about 2
percent.200
III. ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED WITHIN THE FAULT SYSTEM
Several alternatives have been suggested as ways to minimize the
deficiencies of the existing system in meeting the problem of auto-
mobile accident injuries, while retaining the fault principle for loss
allocation. These include:
1. Comparative negligence legislation
2. Compulsory automobile liability insurance
3. Financial responsibility laws
192. Brown, Automobile Accident Litigation in Wisconsin: A Factual Study, 10
Wis. L. Riv. 170, 183 (1935).
193. Adams, A Survey of the Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal
Injuries Resulting from Automobile Accidents in the City of Philadelphia, 1953,
7 TEMPLE U. ECON. & Bus. BULL., March 1955, at 52-56.
194. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT oF PUBLIC WORKS AND BUILDINGS, DIVISION" oF
HIGHWAYS, COST OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS TO ILLINOIS MOTORISTS, 1958,
table 61-01.80-1, at 95 (1962).
195. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 119, at 21. For a full breakdown, see
id., chart III at 25.
196. Bureau of Economic & Business Research, supra note 103, table 34 at 55.
197. AACP, supra note 101, table 4-1 at 138.
198. See AACP, supra note 101, table 1-4 at 59.
199. Id., fig. 1-1 at 61.
200. 2 W. McNtRNnY, HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS: A STUDY OP POPULA-
TION, SERVICES, COSTS, MX'HODS OF PAYMENT, AND CONTROLS 1072 (1962) ; Conard &
Jacobs, supra note 161, at 536.
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4. Compulsory uninsured motorist coverage
5. Compulsory unsatisfied judgment funds
6. Industry-organized unsatisfied judgment funds
7. Repeal of the guest statute
8. Impounding acts
The alternatives mentioned above merely address themselves to
certain particular problems arising from the existing system. They do
not provide an over-all solution to the problem of automobile accident
injury, and are based on the acceptance of fault as the essential principle
of loss distribution. Non-fault alternatives are therefore not dis-
cussed herein.201
1. Comparative negligence legislation
The problem of contributory negligence has been discussed in
the preceding section. It has been suggested that contributory negli-
gence be replaced by a principle of comparative negligence,2 0 2 under
which a division of responsibility for the negligent act is made between
plaintiff and defendant on the basis of their respective share of negli-
gence in causing the accident. Under this system the plaintiff's negli-
gent action only causes him to lose that proportionate part of the
recovery that his share of negligence bears to the total accident, rather
than defeating recovery in its entirety as in contributory negligence.
2. Compulsory automobile liability insurance
Compulsory insurance laws have been enacted with respect to
commercial vehicles in practically all states.2" 3 However, contrary to
the European experience, they have not been widely adopted to non-
commercial vehicles."0 4 Under these laws, liability insurance coverage
is required as a condition precedent to owning or operating an auto-
mobile. In 1927, Massachusetts became the first state in the United
201. Non-fault alternatives have been discussed in detail by the author in a soon to
be published article presently on file in Villanova Law Review Library.
202. Ames, The Automobile Accident Commission Proposal: An Irrational
Concept, 14 U. FLA. L. Rvv. 398, 431-32 (1962); Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal
to the Compensation Plan, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 59, 63-67 (1956).
203. E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 22.574 (1937). See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN,
supra note 99, at 733; Brownfield, Compulsory Liability Insurance for Commercial
Motor Vehicles, 3 LAW & CONTIFMP. PROB. 571 (1936).
204. See Bolgar, Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation: Types and Trends, 2 AM.
J. Comp. L. 515, 516 (1953) ; Deak, Liability and Compensation for Automobile
Accidents, 21 MINN. L. Rlv. 123, 124 (1937) ; Deak, Automobile Accidents: A Com-
parative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe, 79 U. PA. L. Rtv. 271 (1937).
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States to adopt such a law.2"' It requires an applicant for motor
vehicle registration to present evidence that he carries liability
insurance, and cancellation of the insurance calls for the cancel-
lation of the registration. No other state had adopted a similar
law until New York did in 1956.206 A study done in 1932 praised the
Massachusetts law as the most advanced step taken to meet the prob-
lem of uncompensated accident victims, and concluded that the law
had largely eliminated the incidence of financial irresponsibility in that
state.207
Various criticisms have been levelled against compulsory auto-
mobile liability insurance. For example, it is alleged, largely by
spokesmen for the insurance industry,0 " that forcing such insurance
imposes an undesirable tax on driving and tampers with the basic
nature of insurance; that it invites state intervention in the insurance
enterprise; and that it increases claims consciousness and the costs for
the insurance companies while political pressures force them to keep
their rates low. 9 Compulsory insurance is also alleged to promote
social irresponsibility,210 carelessness or recklessness of drivers,2 ' in-
creased danger of insolvency of insurers,2 12 tendency toward state in-
surance service,21 3 and to increase accident litigation and consequent
court congestion.1 4 Actually, however, the fear of state insurance
has not materialized,215 nor has the accident rate noticeably risen as a
205. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-34L (1967). See McNiece & Thornton,
supra note 162, at 608. On the operation of the Massachusetts statute, see Report of
the Special Commission to Study Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance and
Related Matters, MASS. L.Q., Feb. 1930, at 7, 8-288. See also COLUMBIA STUDY,
supra note 112, at 113-25; Blanchard, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance
in Massachusetts, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 537 (1936) ; Grad, Recent Developments
in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300, 312-17 (1950).
206. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 99, at 733.
207. COLUMBIA STUDY, supra note 112, at 217.
208. There have been other interested groups opposing compulsory liability insur-
ance, e.g., farmers in some states. James, History of the Law Governing Recovery
in Automobile Accident Cases, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 321, 326 (1962).
209. CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES SERVING MASSACHUSETTS, THE FIRST
THIRTY YEARS: A COMMENTARY ON THE OPERATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COM-
PULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE ACT (1957); NEw YORK STATE INSURANCE DEP'T,
THE PROBLEMS OP THE UNINSURED MOTORIST (1951); VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE AGENTS, THE UNINSURED MOTORIST (1957). See McVay, The Case
Against Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 150 (1954).
210. See Netherton, Highway Safety Under Different Types of Liability Legisla-
tion, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 110, 125 (1954).
211. See McVay, supra note 208, at 151.
212. N.Y.C.B.A., REPORT ON PROBLEMS CREATED BY FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE
MOTORISTS 9 (1952).
213. Grad, supra note 204, at 314.
214. Id. See also Bohlinger, Which Road for the Uninsured Motoristf, 1951 INS.
L.J. 433; Bohlinger, Compulsory Automobile Insurance - Open or Covert, 25 N.Y.
ST. B. BULL. 336 (1953) ; Moser, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 25 N.Y.
ST. B. BULL. 326 (1953). For criticism, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 14;
McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26 (1941).
215. Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 12; Grad, supra note 204, at 314. The British
and European experience with compulsory insurance has not suggested the necessity
of either imposing detailed state intervention or even regulating premium rates.
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result of the compulsory insurance.21 Furthermore, proper calcula-
tions would avoid rate problems, as in any insurance.217
3. Financial responsibility laws
The first financial responsibility law in the United States was
the Financial and Safety Responsibility Law of Connecticut, adopted
in 1925 and made effective on January 1, 1926.218 It requires the re-
porting of any automobile accident which involved personal injuries
or property damage exceeding $100. A later administrative finding
of fault results in suspension of the registration of all motor vehicles
owned both by the driver or the owner of the automobile at fault.
The suspension continues until the offenders establish proof of future
financial responsibility, which is generally satisfied by the procurement
of liability insurance for a certain amount. Most states have since
enacted financial responsibility legislation, largely as a halfway meas-
ure to compulsory liability insurance, owing to the opposition to the
latter by various insurance organizations and other interested groups.2"'
These laws generally allow a driver to operate an automobile without
liability insurance unless he causes or is involved in an accident re-
sulting in damage to person or property above a certain minimum
amount. If he does so cause, or is involved in an accident, he must
then prove that he is financially able to pay future judgments up to a
certain amount for future accidents in order to retain his license. The
usual proof procured is liability insurance; but failure to provide
proof or, in many jurisdictions, failure to pay the judgment arising
from the first accident results in revocation of the drivers license,
motor vehicle registration, or both.
Based on the experience gained from its adoption, it appears that
this type of law has many weaknesses. First, it does not provide
adequate protection to the victim since (1) it does not affect judg-
ment-proof offenders, (2) it does not operate against a driver not
sued, and (3) it does not protect the victim of the uninsured offender's
first accident. An attempt to meet these deficiencies has been made by
some states. New Hampshire, in 1937,20 passed a law which required all
See generally Deak, supra note 203; Deak, Contributory Liability Insurance Under
the British Road Traffic Acts of 1930 and 1934, 3 LAW & CONTIMP. PROB. 565 (1936).
216. The COLUMBIA STUDY did not show any increase. See James, supra note 112,
at 417 & n.45. See also Grad, supra note 204, at 314.
217. Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 13.
218. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-107 - 143 (1958). See also Ward, The
Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Available and Compara-
tive Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. R~v. 283 (1960).
219. See generally Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTamP.
PROB. 505 (1936) ; Feinsinger, Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 519, 519-20 (1936) ; James, supra note 207, at 326.
220. N.H. Rim. LAWS ch. 268 (1966).
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parties involved in an accident to post security immediately, regardless
of fault. Some pressure for financial responsibility is thus brought
upon the driver by forcing him to provide security for his first acci-
dent.22' Additionally, such legislation seems to have been effective in
inducing motorists to secure liability insurance before their first acci-
dents.22 However, this still presents no solution to the problem of
the insolvent or the judgment-proof offender, or the uninsured offender
who has not yet had an accident. This type of law is further criticized
as being inconsistent with the fault rationale, since it compels the
posting of security by anyone involved in an accident, without regard
to fault. 2 ' Also, while financial responsibility laws utilize the threat
of losing licenses for failure to produce proof of financial responsi-
bility upon the occurrence of an accident to promote safety by making
motorists more careful, no relationship has been found between the
number of suspensions or revocations of licenses and the number of
accidents, and no decrease in accidents has resulted as a consequence
of these laws. 24 Finally, these laws assume the existence of an habitu-
ally careless class of drivers who can be isolated after their first acci-
dents. However, this does not seem to have occurred since there is
no evidence that these laws have compelled careless drivers to secure
21insurance.25 The newer type of law, however, seems to have been
more effective in persuading all drivers to become insured.
4. Compulsory uninsured motorist coverage
Under this approach, the insurer is required by statute to provide
coverage which protects the insured from the owners and operators
of uninsured vehicles if the insured is legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from such owners and operators. This coverage is presently re-
quired by statute in a number of states,220 while other states often offer
the coverage on a voluntary basis. 2 7
221. Grad, supra note 204, at 308-11; Marryott, Automobile Accidents and
Financial Responsibility, 1953 INs. L.J. 758; Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws
Designed to Exclude the Financially Irresponsible Driver from the Highway, 15
OHIO ST. L.J. 191 (1954) ; Wagner, Safety Responsibility Laws - A Review of
Recent Developments, 9 GA. B.J. 160 (1946).
222. E.g., the percentage of insured cars increased in New Hampshire from 36
percent before the enactment of the security law to about 85 percent after its enact-
ment, in New York from 30 to 75 percent, in Indiana from 33 to 74 percent, in Maine
from 36 to 60 percent, and in Minnesota 80 percent of the cars were insured within
eight months of the enactment of the law. Wagner, supra note 220, at 168.
223. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 157, at 17-18. See also Baker, Motor Vehicle Act,
16 TExAs B.J. 693 (1953) ; Hallen, The Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
12 OHIO ST. L.J. 362 (1951).
224. COLUMBIA STUDY, supra note 112, at 97-108, 207-08.
225. Grad, supra note 204, at 306.
226. E.g., N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 268:15 (1957); VA. COnE ANN. § 38.1-381
(Supp. 1968).
227. Ward, supra note 217, at 290.
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5. Compulsory unsatisfied judgment funds
Generally speaking, this approach calls for the creation of a fund
through payments by both insured and uninsured automobile regis-
trants. Unpaid judgments which then arise from automobile acci-
dents are satisfied from the fund. Such funds exist in many countries
abroad,22 and have been established in North Dakota,2
29 New Jersey,2 0
and Maryland.2 31 Uninsured motorists are usually excluded from the
benefits of the fund in the hope of inducing further recourse to liability
insurance by all motorists. If the fund is supported by payments from
all motorists, insured and uninsured, it tends to put an extra burden
on those already carrying insurance; but if it is made up of payments
from only the uninsured motorists, it makes their payment equivalent
to the cost of a liability insurance and essentially amounts to insurance
provided by the state. Such an unsatisfied judgment fund may be
either (1) supplementary to a compulsory liability insurance scheme
as a means of facilitating recovery in cases not covered by compulsory
insurance - i.e., the cases of hit-and-run driver, the stolen car driver,
or the out-of-state uninsured driver, (2) independent of an existing
compulsory liability insurance plan while still providing for these
cases, or (3) alternative to such insurance by providing recovery
against the uninsured driver.3 2
Many criticisms have been made of the fund approach. One
such criticism is that the fund is in an unsatisfactory position to de-
fend against fraudulent claims because of the length of time that must
elapse before the fund is called upon to defend, and because it may
be defrauded by collusion between the plaintiff and defendant. Fur-
ther, critics state that its costs are high because of the lack of oppor-
tunity for an out-of-court settlement, and that citizens do not appreci-
ate the fact that the fund does not relieve them of their own liability.
The insurance industry has alleged that the procedures for securing
payment from the funds are cumbersome, and that the insured motor-
ist is forced to pay the cost of the fund either directly or indirectly
through hidden costs placed upon the insurance companies.233
228. Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 156 (1953) ; Tunc, Establishment of "Fonds de
Guarantie" to Compensate Victims of Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Am. J. ComP. L.
232 (1953).
229. N.D. CNT. CoDE §§ 39-1701 - 1710 (1960).
230. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 39:6-1 - 6-91 (1966).
231. MD. ANN. CODnE art. 66h, §§ 150-79 (1957).
232. See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 99, at 727.
233. Nxw YORK STATE INSURANcE DEP", supra note 208, at 39-37; VIRGINIA
Ass'N OF INSURANcn AGENTS, UNINSURED MOTORIS' 5-6 (1957).
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6. Industry-organized unpaid judgment fund
This suggestion would require that, in order to protect the public
against the risk of insurance carriers becoming insolvent, the insurance
industry contribute to a fund which would meet unpaid judgments left
outstanding because an insurance carrier has become insolvent.
234
7. Repeal of the guest statute
The guest statute defeats recovery if the negligence of the host
driver has not been more than failure to exercise ordinary due care.235
It is suggested that greater protection to the victim of an automobile
accident would result from a repeal of such statutes. The contention
that it is unfair for a guest to sue his host is no longer valid since
most motorists now carry liability insurance and the loss consequently
falls on the insurer rather than the host. It is also pointed out that
there has been no evidence that fraudulent claims against liability
insurers pose a serious problem in those states where there are no
guest statutes, and therefore the fear of fraudulent claims against the
insurance companies in the absence of the guest statute is unfounded. 36
8. Impounding acts
It has been suggested that impounding acts, which provide for
on-the-spot seizure by police of an uninsured automobile involved in
an accident, would help reduce the number of uninsured motorists
and would protect their victims. It is claimed that even though the
value of the automobile seized is seldom sufficient to satisfy a claim
for any severe injury, the inconvenience caused by the seizure might
induce the securing of liability insurance.237 The Highway Traffic
Act of Manitoba is an example of such an impounding statute.2 8
Not surprisingly, insurance interests seem to support the idea of im-
pounding acts.23
IV. CONCLUSION
In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the issues of tort liability were
originally resolved by means dictated by superstition. From the 14th
234. Ames, supra note 201, at 437-38.
235. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. 951h, § 9-201 (1958).
236. See, e.g., White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-paying
Passenger, 20 VA. L. REv. 326, 333 (1934).
237. C. MORRIS, TORTS 367-68 (1953), cited in C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra
note 99, at 725.
238. Statutes of Manitoba ch. 23, § 128-H. See Baillie, Manitoba Safety-
Responsibility Legislation, 3 FED. INS. COUNCIL Q. 17 (1953).
239. See INSURANCE INDUSTRY COMMITTEE ON MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, REPORT
RELATING To THE STATE oF NEw YORK 19 (1951). See also NEw YORK STATE INSUR-
ANCE DEP'T, supra note 208, at 38-40.
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to the middle of the 19th centuries, fault developed as a central element
in deciding liability, although strict liability, imposed without refer-
ence to fault, prevailed for certain activities performed at the actor's
peril. In the 20th century, liability still largely rests on fault, but
there appears to be a trend away from the fault principle. This trend
is seen both with respect to certain harms for which liability is im-
posed without reference to fault and in the workings of the fault sys-
tem itself. This trend seems to have been engendered by the social
problems created by the uncompensated loss. Assignment of liability
is increasingly becoming a matter of whether liability ought to be
imposed,2 40 even though the fault principle would not yield it. The
performance of the fault system for the past few decades in meeting
the problem of automobile-accident injury has demonstrated the failure
of this system in this regard, both in providing prompt and adequate
compensation for the injury and in achieving effective deterrence of
the negligent conduct, these two being commonly considered the pro-
fessed goals of this system.
This failure of the fault system can be analyzed both in conceptual
terms as a principle and in functional terms as a system. Certain con-
ceptual deficiencies of fault as a principle for meeting the problem of
automobile-accident injury may be pointed out. Thus, the use of auto-
mobiles, in the nature as prevails today, is a consequence of the so-
ciety's permissiveness of an activity which would produce accidents.
The reason for this permissiveness is found in the usefulness of the
activity to the society. If this is so, it seems both unfair and illogical
to individualize the fault upon the particular actor involved in the
accident and make him bear the burden of the loss. The conceptual
unsuitability of the fault principle in meeting the problem is further
underscored by a psychological inquiry into its aspects. Fault, in the
sense of morally irresponsible behavior, does not appear among the
psychological and physiological causes of accident-proneness which have
been identified through the studies of the human component of the
accident potential unit.24' In this light, an insistence on the fault
principle of liability would result in two alternative consequences.
Either recovery would be possible only in those very few cases where
personal fault can in fact be found, leaving most of the victims un-
compensated, or the law would continue to find fault artificially where
it in fact does not exist. Either alternative would appear to be un-
240. Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), adopts the theory that
liability for a tort will arise simply on the basis that (1) "the principles of the law
of Torts" will impose it (§ 6) or (2) the conduct in question is a "legal cause" of
the injury, and therefore is of such a character that "the law regards it just to hold
the actor responsible for such harm." (§§ 5, 9). See Carlston, supra note 100, at 49.
241. The other component of the unit is non-human.
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satisfactory. Furthermore, the professed potential of the fault system
in achieving deterrence of automobile accident seems to be based on
a conceptually deficient framework. It addresses itself to the behavior
of the motorists, but behavior of motorists is not the sole constituent
of the accident potential unit and, therefore, not exhaustive of the
avenues for achieving deterrence of accidents. Even there, since these
accidents do not usually result from a morally reprehensible conduct,
a threat of liability addressed to such moral situation of the mind would
not have any effect for the deterrence of the accidents. Moreover, the
tortfeasor in an automobile accident is generally insulated from lia-
bility by insurance or other reasons, which minimizes the threat's
potential, if any, to operate as deterrent.
An examination of the functioning of the fault system with re-
spect to the problem of automobile-accident injury reveals many seri-
ous shortcomings. For example, tort liability accounts for only a little
more than half of all sources of reparation for automobile-accident
injuries, and only about half of the injured persons receiving com-
pensation receive it from tort liability settlements. The compensa-
tion which is yielded by the tort law system is inadequate. It is also
erratically distributed, so that injured persons with small losses tend
to recover in full, or more, while those with large or staggering losses
tend to receive less than their loss, or nothing at all. The delay in
receiving compensation is usually considerable, with the result that it
brings misery and frustration to the victim or his family and it tends
to coerce the victim in accepting a quick settlement. The delay in liti-
gation promotes perjury and innocent misrepresentation. The system
has failed to provide an effective deterrence of automobile accidents
and suffers from the inequities of the defense of contributory negli-
gence. The personal injury suit becomes a worthless remedy if the
defendant is either financially irresponsible or immune. Certain of the
evidentiary aspects of the fault system are unsatisfactory. To attempt
a recovery under this system entails high expense to the victim, which
ranges from one-fourth to one-half of the amount recovered. In addi-
tion, the operating costs of the system to the society are fantastically
high. These stand at about 120 per cent of the net amount of benefits
received by the injured persons, whereas the comparable costs of, say,
the social security programs are only about 2 percent.
What is the solution? The purpose here is not to propose a par-
ticular plan. Instead, a clarification of the approach to the problem
is attempted. Upon that clarification, specific proposals can be formu-
lated. The myopia of fault perspective obscures imaginative solutions
to the problem. Once that is overcome, a satisfactory approach to
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the problem would call for a separation of its two aspects, namely,
minimization of automobile accidents and provision of prompt and
adequate compensation to the victims of these accidents. Independent
solutions can be devised for these two separate aspects of the problem.
Thus, in order to minimize the accidents the accident-producing factors
in both the human and non-human components of the accident potential
unit can be identified, and these identified causes can be dealt with on
their own terms. Attention can be paid to eliminating or minimizing
each of these causes by whatever means appropriate. In order to
achieve prompt and adequate compensation for the injury, with the
least amount of expense to the injured person and to the society, a plan
of compensation can be developed in the nature of a social security
fund, created for all accidental harm or for harm from automobile
accidents. A clarification of the approach to the problem is essential
to developing a sound solution or plan.
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